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Abstract: We correct an omission in the de¯nition of the domain of weakly responsive pref-
erences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of
stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are
adjusted accordingly.
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1 Two Counter Examples
The model and notation are as in KK05. The following example demonstrates that the weak
responsiveness condition of KK05 is not su±cient to ensure the existence of stable matchings.
KK05's weakly responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk;sl) has weakly responsive prefer-
ences if there exist preferences <sk and <sl such that
(i) for all h 2 H,
(u;h) Âc (u;u) if and only if h Âsl u and (h;u) Âc (u;u) if and only if h Âsk u
(ii) for all hp;hq;hr 2 H [ fug,
[hp<sku, hq<slu, and hpÂskhr imply (hp;hq)Âc(hr;hq)] and
[hp<slu, hq<sku, and hpÂslhr imply (hq;hp)Âc(hq;hr)].
Example 1.1 Counter example to KK05's Theorem 3.3 (Existence).
Consider the couples market (PH;PC) where preferences are given by Table 1.1
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 (s1;s2) (s3;s4)
s1 s3 s1 s3 h1;h2 h2;h3
s4 s2 s4 s2 h3;h4 h4;h1
; ; ; ; u;u u;u
... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 1: Couples market 1.1
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1matching h1 h2 h3 h4 blocking coalition
1 s1 s2 ; ; ((s3;s4);(h2;h3))
2 ; s3 s4 ; ((s1;s2);(h3;h4))
3 ; ; s1 s2 ((s3;s4);(h4;h1))
4 s4 ; ; s3 ((s1;s2);(h1;h2))
Table 2: Matchings and blocking coalitions
The next two claims prove that this couples market is a counter example to Theorem 3.3 in
KK05.
Claim 1. The couples market described in Table 1 has no stable matching.
Let ¹ be a matching and m be the number of matched students at ¹.
Case m = 0: Clearly, ((s1;s2);(h1;h2)) is a blocking coalition for ¹.
Case m = 1;3: There is a couple with only one matched member. This couple would prefer
both its members being unmatched. So, ¹ is not individually rational.
Case m = 2: If a couple is not matched to one of the two acceptable hospital combinations as
speci¯ed in Table 1, then ¹ is not individual rational. This leaves us with the four matchings
displayed in Table 2, for each of which a blocking coalition for ¹ is provided.
Case m = 4: By individual rationality, (s1;s2) is matched to either (h1;h2) or (h3;h4) and
(s3;s4) is matched to either (h2;h3) or (h4;h1); a contradiction to the feasibility of ¹. ¦
Claim 2. The couples' preferences in Table 1 are (KK05-)weakly responsive.
Let P(si) = u;¢¢¢ (i = 1;2;3;4). We check weak responsiveness conditions (i) and (ii).
(i): For no c 2 C, there is an h 2 H with (u;h) Âc (u;u) or (h;u) Âc (u;u). Similarly, for no
s 2 S, there is an h 2 H with h Âs u. So, condition (i) is satis¯ed.
(ii): For each s 2 S and each h 2 H, u <s h. So, in condition (ii), hp = u and hq = u. Since for
any hr 2 H, (u;u) Âc (hr;u) and (u;u) Âc (u;hr), condition (ii) is also satis¯ed. ¦
The next example, which was provided by Fuhito Kojima, demonstrates that based on the
de¯nition of couples' weakly responsive preferences only over feasible pairs, not all matchings
that are stable in the so-called associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) need to be stable for
the original couples market (PH;PC).
Example 1.2 Counter example to KK05's Theorem 3.3 (Stability).
Consider the couples market (PH;PC) and the associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) where
preferences are given by Table 3.
PH PC PS(PC)
h1 h2 (s1;s2) s1 s2
s1 s2 h1;h2 h2 h1
s2 s1 h2;h1 h1 h2





Table 3: Couples market 1.2
2It is easy to check that the associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) has two stable matchings,
namely ¹(S) = h1;h2 and ¹0(S) = h2;h1. However, ¹0 is not stable for the original couples
market (PH;PC). ¦
2 Corrections: Weak Responsiveness and Domain Maximality
Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 in KK05 are a®ected by the omission in the de¯nition of weak responsive-
ness that Example 1.1 illustrates. We now formulate a weak additional condition that is in line
with KK05's intuitive motivation and description of weak responsiveness.
The driving force behind Example 1.1 is that for a couple two individually undesirable
positions can be combined to a desirable allotment. To exclude this possibility, we add condition
(iii) to KK05's de¯nition of weak responsiveness.
Weakly responsive preferences, condition (iii):
(iii) for all h0;h00 2 H, h0 6= h00, uÂskh0 and uÂslh00 imply (u;u) Âc (h0;h00).
KK05 (page 82, lines 9-12) motivated weak responsiveness as follows: \The idea of this ex-
tension [i.e., from responsiveness to weak responsiveness] is that the exact associated preferences
that deal with the comparison of unacceptable positions are irrelevant with respect to stability
since an agent can always replace any unacceptable position with unemployment." Without
condition (iii), the only case where the agents in a couple may not want to replace their unac-
ceptable positions by unemployment occurs when the combination of them is acceptable { a case
that is now excluded by (iii). We would like to emphasize that since condition (iii) is still in line
with the intuition that motivated weak responsiveness, we do not ¯nd it necessary to change the
nomenclature. The corrected weak responsiveness is logically equivalent to Nakamura's (2005)
\reasonable responsiveness" condition.
The driving force behind Example 1.2 is that even though h2 is student s1's individually best
hospital and h1 is student s2's individually best hospital, as a couple (s1;s2) prefers (h1;h2) to
(h2;h1). One reason why the couples' preferences in Example 1.2 are weakly responsive is that
we have de¯ned couples' preferences only over ordered pairs of di®erent hospitals.
One way to deal with the pathological character of Example 1.2 is to drop the feasibility
constraint in the de¯nition of couples' preferences, i.e., to assume that couples' preferences
include entries of the form (h;h), h 2 H. Then, the couples' preferences in Example 1.2 are no
longer weakly responsive (we would have (h2;h1) Âc (h1;h1) Âc (h1;h2)).2 The drawback of
this correction is that then the proof of another result is a®ected and cannot easily be restored.3
Alternatively, we can relax the statement of KK05's Theorem 3.3 as follows.
KK05's Theorem 3.3 (Stability for weakly responsive preferences)
Let (PH;PC) be a couples market where couples have weakly responsive preferences. Then,
any matching that is stable for an associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) induces4 a stable
matching for (PH;PC). In particular, there exists a stable matching for (PH;PC).
Proof. The ¯rst 13 lines of the proof are identical to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in KK05. Then
the next two lines should be adjusted as follows (the change is marked in bold face). \Assume
hp Ásk u and hq Ásl u. Then by weak responsiveness (iii), (u;u) Âc (hp;hq). Using :::" The
proof continues now as in KK05 until the end of page 83. We then continue as follows.
2Note that with this correction line 1 on page 84 in KK05's proof of Theorem 3.3 would be correct since with
our correction (hp;¹(sl)) is also a part of the couples' preferences if hp = ¹(sl).
3The construction in our proof of KK05's Theorem 3.5 that we present later will not work, e.g., in Cases 2.2
and 2.3, the entry (hr;hq) with hr = hq would be problematic.
4That is, any matching ¹ that is stable for (P
H;P
S(P
C)) either is also stable for (P
H;P
C) or a stable matching
for (P
H;P
C) can be easily obtained from ¹ as explained in the proof.
3If hp 6= ¹(sl), then weak responsiveness (ii) implies (¹(sk);¹(sl)) ºc (hp;¹(sl)) ºc (hp;hq),
which contradicts (b1). If hq 6= ¹(sk), then similarly we obtain a contradiction to (b2). Note
that the only case for which the last argument does not apply is the case where hp = ¹(sl) and
hq = ¹(sk). In other words, all blocking coalitions are of the form ((sk;sl);(¹(sl);¹(sk))). Then
we can easily obtain a stable matching ¹0 from ¹ by satisfying all these blocking coalitions, i.e.,
for all couples (sk;sl) involved in a blocking coalition, ¹0(sk) = ¹(sl) and ¹0(sl) = ¹(sk). 2
Next, we state KK05's Theorem 3.5 and provide a completely new and more accessible proof
(an alternative proof can be found in Nakamura, 2005).
KK05's Theorem 3.5 (Maximal Domain I)
For couples markets with restricted strictly unemployment averse couples, the domain of weakly
responsive preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings.
Proof. Let c1 = (s1;s2) and <c1 be such that c1's preferences are restricted strictly unemploy-
ment averse, but not weakly responsive.
Consider students' preferences <s1 and <s2 de¯ned such that for all h;h0 2 H[fug, [h<s1h0 if
and only if (h;u)<c1(h0;u)] and [h<s2h0 if and only if (u;h)<c1(u;h0)]. In particular, preferences
<s1, <s2, and <c1 satisfy (i).
Couple c1's preferences not being responsive means that there do not exist students' pref-
erences that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). Thus, <s1 and <s2 as de¯ned above, together
with <c1, violate condition (ii) or (iii). For each possible violation of (ii) or (iii) we either show
that it is incompatible with restricted strict unemployment aversion or we construct preferences
of the hospitals and restricted strictly unemployment averse and weakly responsive preferences
of the other couples such that no stable matching exists.
Case 1. Assume that <s1, <s2, and <c1 violate condition (iii).
Then, there exist h0;h00 2 H, h0 6= h00, such that uÂs1h0, uÂs2h00, and (h0;h00) Âc1 (u;u). Thus,
by the de¯nition of <s1 and <s2, (u;u)Âc1(h0;u) and (u;u)Âc1(u;h00).
Now, for h0;h00 and h 2 Hnfh0;h00g we specify P(h0) = s1;s3;;;:::, P(h00) = s3;s2;;;:::,
and P(h) = ;;:::. Couple c2 = (s3;s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse responsive
preferences based on P(s3) = h0;h00;u;::: and P(s4) = u;:::. Note that for any individually
rational matching ¹, ¹(c2) 2 f(h0;u);(h00;u);(u;u)g. Assume that ¹ is stable. Then, ¹(c1) 2
f(h0;h00);(u;u)g. If ¹(c2) = (u;u), then ¹ is be blocked by (c2;(h00;u)). If ¹(c2) = (h00;u), then
¹(c1) = (u;u). Hence, ¹ is blocked by (c2;(h0;u)). If ¹(c2) = (h0;u), then ¹ is blocked by
(c1;(h0;h00)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked.
Case 2. Assume that <s1, <s2, and <c1 violate condition (ii). We split condition (ii) into
subconditions:
(iia) Condition (ii) for hr = u: for all hp;hq 2 H [ fug,
(iia.1) [hpÂs1u and hq<s2u imply (hp;hq)Âc1(u;hq)] and
(iia.2) [hpÂs2u and hq<s1u imply (hq;hp)Âc1(hq;u)],
(iib) Condition (ii) for uÂs1hr: for all hp;hq;hr 2 H [ fug,
(iib.1) [hp<s1uÂs1hr and hq<s2u imply (hp;hq)Âc1(hr;hq)] and
(iib.2) [hp<s2uÂs2hr and hq<s1u imply (hq;hp)Âc1(hq;hr)],
(iic) Condition (ii) for hrÂs1u: for all hp;hq;hr 2 H [ fug,
(iic.1) [hpÂs1hrÂs1u and hq<s2u imply (hp;hq)Âc1(hr;hq)] and
(iic.2) [hpÂs2hrÂs2u and hq<s1u imply (hq;hp)Âc1(hq;hr)].
Case 2.1. Restricted strict unemployment aversion implies (iia).
(iia.1): Consider hpÂs1u and hq<s2u. Thus, by the de¯nition of <s1 and <s2, (hp;u)Âc1(u;u)
and (u;hq)<c1(u;u). If hq = u, then (hp;u)Âc1(u;u) implies (iia.1). If hq 6= u, then hqÂs2u and,
4by the de¯nition of <s2, (u;hq)Âc1(u;u). Hence, by restricted strict unemployment aversion,
(hp;hq)Âc1(u;hq) and (iia.1) holds. The proof for (iia.2) is similar.
Case 2.2. Assume that <s1, <s2, and <c1 violate condition (iib).
(iib.1): Consider hp<s1uÂs1hr and hq<s2u. Thus, by the de¯nition of <s1 and <s2,
(hp;u)<c1(u;u)Âc1(hr;u) and (u;hq)<c1(u;u). If hq = u, then (hp;u)Âc1(hr;u) implies (iib.1).
Thus, let hq 6= u and assume, in contradiction to (iib.1), (hr;hq)Âc1(hp;hq). By restricted strict
unemployment aversion, (hp;hq)<c1(u;hq)Âc1(u;u). Thus, (hr;hq)Âc1(u;hq)Âc1(u;u).
For hr;hq 2 H and h 2 Hnfhr;hqg we specify P(hr) = s1;s3;;;:::, P(hq) = s3;s2;;;:::,
and P(h) = ;;:::. Couple c2 = (s3;s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse responsive
preferences based on P(s3) = hr;hq;u;::: and P(s4) = u;:::. For any individually rational
matching ¹, ¹(c2) 2 f(hr;u);(hq;u);(u;u)g. Assume that ¹ is stable. If ¹(c2) = (u;u), then ¹ is
blocked by (c2;(hq;u)). If ¹(c2) = (hr;u), then by individual rationality, ¹(c1) 2 f(u;u);(u;hq)g.
Hence, ¹ is blocked by (c1;(hr;hq)). If ¹(c2) = (hq;u), then by individual rationality, ¹(c1) =
(u;u). Hence, ¹ is blocked by (c2;(hr;u)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked.
The proof for (iib.2) is similar.
Case 2.3. Assume that <s1, <s2, and <c1 violate condition (iic).
(iic.1): Consider hpÂs1hrÂs1u and hq<s2u. Thus, by the de¯nition of <s1 and <s2,
(hp;u)Âc1(hr;u)Âs1(u;u) and (u;hq)<s2(u;u). If hq = u, then (hp;u)Âc1(hr;u) implies (iic.1).
Thus, let hq 6= u and assume, in contradiction to (iic.1), (hr;hq)Âc1(hp;hq). By restricted
strict unemployment aversion, (hp;hq)Âc1(hp;u)Âc1(u;u) and (hp;hq)Âc1(u;hq)Âc1(u;u). Thus,
(hr;hq)Âc1(hp;hq)Âc1(u;u), (hr;hq)Âc1(hp;u), and (hr;hq)Âc1(u;hq).
For hp;hr;hq 2 H and h 2 Hnfhp;hr;hqg we specify P(hp) = s1;;;:::, P(hr) = s1;s3;;;:::,
P(hq) = s3;s2;;;:::, and P(h) = ;;:::. Couple c2 = (s3;s4) has restricted strictly unemploy-
ment averse responsive preferences based on P(s3) = hr;hq;u;::: and P(s4) = u;:::. For any
individually rational matching ¹, ¹(c2) 2 f(hr;u);(hq;u);(u;u)g. Assume that ¹ is stable. If
¹(c2) = (u;u), then ¹ is blocked by (c2;(hq;u)). If ¹(c2) = (hr;u), then by individual rationality,
¹(c1) 2 f(hp;hq);(hp;u));(u;hq);(u;u)g. Hence, ¹ is blocked by (c1;(hr;hq)).
If ¹(c2) = (hq;u), then by individual rationality, ¹(c1) 2 f(hp;u);(hr;u);(u;u)g. If ¹(c1) 2
f(hp;u);(u;u)g, then ¹ is blocked by (c2;(hr;u)). If ¹(c1) = (hr;u), then ¹ is blocked by
(c1;(hp;u)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked. The proof for (iic.2) is
similar. 2
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